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Con-Resistant Trust for Improved Reliability in a
Smart-Grid Special Protection System
Crystal M. Shipman, Kenneth M. Hopkinson, Senior Member, IEEE, and Juan Lopez, Jr.
Abstract—This paper applies a con-resistant trust mechanism
to improve the performance of a communications-based special
protection system to enhance its effectiveness and resiliency. Smart
grids incorporate modern information technologies to increase
reliability and efficiency through better situational awareness.
However, with the benefits of this new technology come the added
risks associated with threats and vulnerabilities to the technology
and to the critical infrastructure it supports. The research in
this paper uses con-resistant trust to quickly identify malicious
or malfunctioning (untrustworthy) protection system nodes to
mitigate instabilities. The con-resistant trust mechanism allows
protection system nodes to make trust assessments based on the
node's cooperative and defective behaviors. These behaviors are
observed via frequency readings which are prediodically reported.
The trust architecture is tested in experiments by comparing a
simulated special protection system with a con-resistant trust
mechanism to one without the mechanism via an analysis of the
variance statistical model. Simulation results show promise for
the proposed con-resistant trust mechanism.
Index Terms—Con-resistant trust, critical infrastructure, repu-
tation-based trust, smart grid, special protection systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
S MART-GRID technologies promise to modernize thepower grid, improve efficiency and reliability, and help
meet increasing power demands through better communication
to facilitate coordination and situational awareness [1], [2], [3].
While full of potential, efforts to modernize the grid, on top
of legacy systems, have created a cyber-infrastructure that is
susceptible to threats and vulnerabilities [1], [4].
Special protection systems (SPS) detect power grid distur-
bances and take predetermined actions to counteract them in a
controlled manner [5]. Large system disturbances, such as tran-
sient instabilities, require an immediate response to prevent cas-
cading power outages. This paper is motivated by the proper
SPS response to system disturbances, which can be complicated
by malfunctions and malicious entities.
Fadul [6] created a context-specific reputation-based trust
mechanism to improve SPS decision making in the presence of
failures and disruptions caused by malfunctioning or malicious
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smart-grid components. This paper proposes an SPS with a
con-resistant trust mechanism that can operate more effectively
under such conditions. The con-resistant trust enhanced SPS
uses load-shedding strategies to mitigate transient instabilities.
The core contribution of this paper is in the application of
existing trust algorithms, which have been used in cooperative
cybersystems, to cyberphysical security. Three main questions
are investigated. First, does an SPS with a con-resistant trust
mechanism successfully determine and execute an appropriate
load-shedding strategy during system-wide disturbances in the
presence of untrustworthy (malicious or malfunctioning) agent
nodes? Second, does an SPS with a con-resistant trust mech-
anism keep the system's steady frequency above a 58.8-Hz
threshold? Third, can an SPS implemented with a con-resistant
trust mechanism perform at least as well as Fadul's reputa-
tion-based trust mechanisms?
This paper is divided into seven sections. Section I is the in-
troduction. Section II presents related work. Section III gives
a model of the adversary. Section IV describes the proposed
con-resistant trust mechanism. Section V covers the method-
ology and simulated test environment. Section VI presents re-
sults and Section VII concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. SPSs
SPSs detect disturbances and take predetermined actions to
counteract the conditions in a controlled manner to return to an
acceptable equilibrium [5]. Two common types of SPS schemes
are based on generation rejection and underfrequency load shed-
ding [7]. Generation rejection involves selectively tripping gen-
erating units during severe transmission system disturbances
[8]. Load shedding reduces the connected load to a level that
can be safely supplied by generation[8].
The communications-based smart grid enables better con-
text awareness and better SPS protection system decisions for
system disturbances [6]. Trust systems improve protection sys-
tems by estimating and acting on component reliability.
B. Reputation-Based Trust
Reputation-based trust is found in many computing systems
where trust is based on observations and is often binary [9] in the
sense that an entity is entirely trusted or untrusted. This paper
uses a context-specific reputation-based trust. In context-spe-
cific reputation-based trust, an entity (the truster) trusts another
entity (the trustee) with respect to a certain context [9], [10].
Here, context is synonymouswith service. Context-specific trust
is based on direct and indirect trust. Direct trust of an entity
U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright.
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evolves from direct interaction experiences with other entities
[10]. In this model, the term interaction denotes an action re-
garding a context or service. Indirect trust occurs when there
is no history of direct interactions between two entities. In this
case, recommendations from trusted peers with direct interac-
tions with the entity are considered [10].
C. Multimechanism Trust Model
Duncan's CTMS [11] extends Zhao's earlier work [12] to
make trust decisions for satellite telecommand systems.
CTMS uses interactions and credentials to calculate entity
trust values. Trust is based on the number of cooperative and
defective interactions [13]. Trust is easily lost but hard to gain.
Duncan incorporated Salehi-Abari and White's [14] and Yu
and Singh's [13] trust models, which are resistant to con-man
(confidence-man) attacks. In such attacks, a con-man conducts a
series of consecutive cooperative interactions to elevate its trust
value. The con-man then defects, defrauding the victim. The
con-man has two choices: 1) never interact with the victim again
or 2) regain the lost trust with subsequent cooperative behavior.
The con-man can then again con the victim [14].
While this paper concentrates on these trust models, many
alternatives exist. Good survey articles on trust applied to com-
puting domains were written by Sherchan, Nepal, and Paris [15]
and Grandison and Sloman [16].
D. Reputation-Based Trust for SPSs
Fadul's reputation-based trust-management toolkit (TMT) [6]
uses communication to improve decision making in the pres-
ence of failures and disruptions attributed to malfunctioning or
malicious components. The TMT was applied to an SPS where
it used reputation-based trust to improve fault-response times
and resiliency to component faults/failures and communication
errors. The TMT consists of three major modules that calcu-
late entity trust values. The Trust Assignment Module uses con-
text-sensitive information, such as frequency data from indi-
viduals, to determine trust values. The fault detection module
uses error signals from frequency disturbance monitoring de-
vices to detect faults. The decision module analyzes current
power conditions and assigns trust values to decide the most re-
liable corrective action to contain a disturbance. The TMT uses
a majority-rule algorithm where trust values are assigned based
on information from multiple entities. Only entities that agree
with the trusted majority are trusted. The TMT greedily selects
trusted nodes to load shed.
III. MODEL OF THE ADVERSARY
The malicious adversary in this paper's experiments has the
ability to subvert five, ten, or fifteen loads. A subverted node
intentionally misreports its frequency reading and will not shed
load on command. This is a relatively simple adversary. It al-
lows an investigation into the use of trust mechanisms to detect
and respond to failures, which may be caused by an adversary
with limited resources. This mimics scenarios ranging from ac-
tual malicious actors to merely adverse conditions.
Experiments focus on the first 0.5 s after a disturbance. If
an SPS is successful, if it can shed enough load to keep the
frequency at or above 58.8 Hz. The 58.8-Hz threshold is derived
from physical generator constraints [17], [18].
The frequency is evaluated after 50 s of simulation time to
judge the SPS's success or failure. The goal of the adversary
was to disrupt frequency readings during the first 0.5 s to trick
the SPS into shedding the wrong amount of load. This attack
works because the SPS tested uses the generators' frequency
measurements to determine the load to shed after a disturbance.
The nodes do this by subtracting a random amount, up to 3.33%
of the real frequency reading, at each reporting opportunity. The
trust system in the experiments considers a reading to be faulty
and, hence, malfunctioning, whenever its reported frequency
is not within 3.6% of one standard deviation of the mean re-
ported frequency from all nodes. As discussed in Section V-E,
, where . This is a simple marker for
malicious behavior. In a real system, there are many potential
trust markers, which could be used to cross-validate trust mea-
surements and to look for a much wider range of behaviors and
conditions. The intent of the simulations in this paper is to give
a proof of concept prototyping a trust method by using just one
simple type of trust marker with the implicit acknowledgement
that a real system would involve additional trust markers to en-
hance robustness.
IV. CON-RESISTANT TRUST
A. Trust Implementation
The trust-management system in this paper is primarily
derived from Yu and Singh's work in reputation management
in electronic interacting communities [13]. The goal is to
avoid interactions with undesirable entities. The interaction
trust (I-Trust) mechanism calculates and maintains I-Trust
values, based on a particular interaction marker, for each of the
agent nodes in the system. The interaction marker used in this
scenario is the reported frequency for each agent node. The
I-Trust value is calculated based on this interaction marker.
The I-Trust value is compared to its peers to see if its reading
is within 3.6% of one standard deviation of the mean reported
frequency from all nodes. Agent nodes with an I-Trust value
within this threshold are considered trusted and are otherwise
untrusted. The method for calculating I-Trust is as follows.
B. How Trust is Calculated
To enforce the previously described trust implementation, an
I-Trust value is defined below.
• DEFINITION 1: is the trust value assigned by the
I-Trust mechanism to node for interaction marker .
and is initialized to zero [13].
The I-Trust mechanism calculates a trust value for agent node
based upon the interactions involving agent node affecting
marker . Positive and negative interactions can be defined in
game theory as cooperation and defection, respectively [14].
The simulations in this paper only look at one sample trust
marker based on frequency reporting to illustrate the concepts
in this paper. In these simulations, an agent node is cooperating
when it is reporting a frequency value within 3.6% of one stan-
dard deviation of themean of all nodes' reported frequencies. An
agent node is defecting when it is reporting a frequency value
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TABLE I
SIMPLE INTERACTION TRUST ALGORITHM [11], [13]
TABLE II
CON-RESISTANT INTERACTION TRUST ALGORITHM [14]
equal to or below 58.8 Hz. Cooperation interaction by agent
node generates a positive evidence , and a defection inter-
action by agent node generates a negative evidence . This
requires and . Values for and can be ei-
ther static or dynamic. Generally, trust relationships are set so
that trust is easy to lose and hard to gain[13]. This relationship
is achieved in DEFINITION 2 by requiring that .
• DEFINITION 2: After an interaction, the trust value
is calculated by the algorithm in Table I which
considers the previous trust value [13]. Once the cal-
culations in Table I are complete, updates are made to ,
, and/or as in Table II. After these updates, a boundary
check is executed so that ,
where is a small positive value to ensure that .
Also, and
to ensure that and .
The Simple Intraction Trust Algorithm[11], [13] in
Table I calculates I-Trust values. In [14], Salehi-Abari and
White tested this algorithm against a con-man attack, as defined
in Section II-C. The authors showed that Yu and Singh's trust
algorithm displayed con-resistance when its input parameters
were chosen so that trust increments were small after a defec-
tion, and penalties for each defection were high. We apply this
idea to create an SPS con-resistant trust algorithm.
To make Yu and Singh's [13] simple interaction trust algo-
rithm resistant to a con-man attack, Salehi-Abari andWhite pro-
posed adding two characteristics [14].
• Cautiously increment trust with each cooperation: An
agent's corresponding trust value should be increased more
slowly by each perceived consecutive cooperation.
• Larger punishment after each defection:An agent's cor-
responding trust value should be dropped more sharply by
each perceived defection.
These characteristics are implemented by dynamically ad-
justing and based on agent interactions with node . The
modified trust value is defined in DEFINITION 3 below.
• DEFINITION 3: and are determined for Con-Re-
sistant trust calculations by the algorithm in Table II, where
is a constant for node .
The con-resistant interaction trust algorithm (I-Trust) [11],
[14] in Table II extend Yu and Singh's simple interaction trust
Fig. 1. EPOCHS simulation system [19].
algorithm. Here, is the positive reward for cooperation and
is the negative punishment for defection, as in the simple in-
teraction trust algorithm. However, a defection will decrease
and will increase the absolute value of based on the charac-
teristics listed before. Forgiveness is slower when several defec-
tions have occurred, and punishments are bigger for those who
defect more often [14].
The con-resistant trust algorithm introduces variables in its
I-Trust value calculation. The initial value for is preserved
as . Based on the equations presented in Table II, will
increase for each cooperation; however, it will never exceed
[14]. Furthermore, is decreased at the rate of which
results in a large decrement for for a high value of and a
small decrement of for a low value of [14]. Discounting
factors, and as well as a constant are also introduced.
is the discounting factor for a defection with respect to node
and is proportional to the absolute value of the previous I-Trust
value . The authors hypothesized that the discounting factor
should be high when the target agent's I-Trust value is close
to 1 (trusted) or (untrusted) since, ”Trust is hard to earn but
easy to lose” [14]. Furthermore, if an agent has a high value
of because of previous defections, its value should be in-
creased more slowly when it is cooperating; thus, a node's
value should decrease as the magnitude of its value increases
[14].
V. METHODOLOGY AND SIMULATED TEST ENVIRONMENT
A. Simulation Environment
Article simulations make use of the electric power and
communication synchronizing simulator (EPOCHS) [19].
EPOCHS (see Fig. 1) combines the PSS/E electromechanical
transient simulator [20], the PSCAD/EMTDC electromagnetic
transient simulator [21], and the NS2 network simulator [22].
The AgentHQ presents a unified environment to agents [19].
The RTI synchronizes timing between the simulators [19].
EPOCHS allows users to simulate wide-area smart-grid en-
vironments, such as the one depicted in Fig. 2. Such environ-
ments consist of wide-area communication networks intercon-
necting control centers, power generation plants, substations,
and customers, traditional protection and control systems, and
smart protection and control systems residing in smart remote
terminal units (RTUs) and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs).
EPOCHS has three agent types: control, load, and generator
agents. There is one control agent node, 30 load agents, and 50
generator agents in the simulation scenario, which is based on
the IEEE 50-Generator test case [23]. Each of these agent nodes
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Fig. 2. Abstract representation of a smart-grid wide-area network [19].
has the ability to directly access and modify its corresponding
power component's data and to use network communication.
The communications network is based on 100-Mb/s lines.
B. Simulation Scenario
The simulation scenario uses a modified IEEE 50-generator/
145-bus test case by Hopkinson et al. [19] to demonstrate the
benefits of the con-resistant trust mechanism in an SPS.
The SPS monitors the system frequency for disturbances in-
dicative of imminent fault and attempts to mitigate the fault by
using two of the most common types of SPS schemes: 1) gen-
eration rejection and 2) load shedding [7]. Generation rejection
reduces power to transfer over critical transmission interfaces
[8]. Load shedding reduces the load to a level that can be safely
supplied by available generation [8].
The scenario begins with two high-capacity transmission
lines down, resulting in a transiently unstable system requiring
SPS action. Generator 93 was preselected for generation
rejection and commanded to trip or go offline by the SPS. Con-
tingencies resulting from generator tripping cause an imbalance
between generation and load [24]. Depending on power loss,
the frequency can reach low levels. When this occurs, other
generating units can trip, resulting in cascading events leading
to system blackouts unless SPS actions are taken [24]. The
frequency of 58.8 Hz is chosen as the frequency threshold
for SPS success based on previous research [6], [19], [25].
Operating too far below this threshold can cause an increase in
generator turbine vibrations, ultimately damaging the generator
causing it to fail [8].
The additional SPS action taken is load shedding. The goal
is to shed enough load to keep the system's frequency above a
preset level following a system disturbance, such as generation
loss [19]. The SPS uses an algorithm to estimate the system's
disturbance size and the amount of load shedding required to
maintain the system frequency above 58.8 Hz [19] using
(1)
In (1), the size of the disturbance is equal to the accel-
erating power , which is proportional to the change in the
system's frequency, plus the change in electrical power demand
due to the variation in frequency and voltage. is the key
to finding the amount of lost generation. and denote the
time immediately before and after the disturbance. and
can be obtained from wide-area measurements of the genera-
tors' operating status and system frequency samples before and
after the disturbance, but measurements must be taken simulta-
neously throughout the region. [19].
The maximum load shed amount is set to 20% of the avail-
able load, which is a typical value [8], [26]. Once the load shed
amount is determined, it is imposed on selected loads. A sorting
algorithm determines which nodes are selected for load shed-
ding. In the original SPS, loads are sorted based on their avail-
able load-shed amounts. In the SPS with con-resistant trust,
loads are sorted by their assigned trust values and available
load-shed amounts. The goal is to load shed a calculated amount
to keep the frequency above 58.8 Hz [19].
C. Abuse Case
The abuse case is based upon the SPS's ability to detect un-
trustworthy agent behavior during system updates. Each sim-
ulation runs for 50 s to ensure that the system has stabilized.
Throughout the simulation, the SPS's control agent node re-
ceives updates from load and generator agent nodes every 2o
ms. These updates include the load agent's current operating fre-
quency level. The con-resistant trust mechanism also calculates
and reports the I-Trust values during each interaction. At 0.18
s, generator 93 is commanded to trip and at a time of 0.184 s,
it goes offline. Four milliseconds later at time 0.192 s, the SPS
makes the determination of which loads to shed based on trust
values.
D. Performance Metrics
The primary metric used to evaluate the SPS's performance
with and without con-resistant trust is the system frequency.
Success is determined by the SPS's ability to accurately iden-
tify which load agents are trustworthy and untrustworthy and
its ability to select a sufficient number of trustworthy nodes to
shed load to keep the steady-state frequency above 58.8 Hz. The
critical system frequency threshold is 58.8 Hz because operating
below this threshold can cause an increase in damaging gener-
ator turbine vibrations or can lead to cascading events and black-
outs through protection actions [8].
E. System Parameters
Systems parameters are characteristics that can affect the per-
formance of the SPS with con-resistant trust. They include the
frequency tolerance and , and the constant .
In this paper, untrustworhy nodes have a tolerance value sub-
tracted from their reported frequency, which is randomized to
simulate realistic fluctuations due to inherent noise.
Abari and White's simple interaction trust algorithm used
and values based on a 1 to 10 penalty ratio of cooperative
to defective interactions [14]. In this paper, a 1 to 3 penalty
ratio is utilized for the cooperative and defective interactions,
specifically 0.15 for and 0.45 for .
One goal of the con-resistant trust system is to detect an un-
trustworthy node even if it only begins defective behavior at the
start of a fault that requires an SPS response. The total time al-
lowed to calculate the load to shed and shed load to prevent a
frequency drop below 58.8 Hz is 0.5 s.
is a multiple used to calculate the defection discounting
factor with respect to node , as in Table II. Abari andWhite
[14] kept between zero and one with a specific value of .
This paper also uses a constant .
F. Experimental Design and Evaluation
The SPS with con-resistant trust is evaluated via simulation.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) and a comparison of con-
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Fig. 3. Comparison of SPS behavior with and without con-resistant trust. (a)
The original SPS is unable to keep the frequency above 58.8 Hz. (b) The SPS
with con-resistant trust keeps the frequency above 58.8 Hz.
fidence intervals via the R statistical package [27], [28] are
used to determine the simulation results' statistical significance.
ANOVA tests whether the means among two or more groups
are equal, assuming normally distributed populations [29].
SPS experiments have two factors: 1) the number of untrust-
worthy nodes and 2) whether the SPS uses con-resistant trust.
There are three treatment levels of untrustworthy nodes: five,
ten, or fifteen. Untrustworthy nodes are chosen at random from
30 loads. Each simulation is replicated 36 times. Thirty-six
replicated trials per simulation were chosen because the central
limit theorem generally takes hold once the number of trials
rises above 30, yielding an approximately normal data distri-
bution [30]. A final set of simulations compares the SPS with
con-resistant trust to Fadul's reputation-based trust[6]. The data
collected during each run is the minimum system frequency.
VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Simulation results support the use of an SPS with con-resis-
tant trust over a traditional SPS. Fig. 3(a) and (b) shows original
SPS frequency levels versus an SPS with con-resistant trust, re-
spectively. Fig. 3(b) shows that the SPS with con-resistant trust
can successfully keep the system's steady-state frequency above
58.8 Hz whereas the original SPS without a trust implementa-
tion in Fig. 3(a) does not. These plots show the frequency at gen-
erator 110 from time 0 to 50 s. Real protection systems would
take equipment offline near 58.8 Hz. These plots show the fre-
quency at steady state.
The remaining experiments will use the final stable frequency
at time 50 s without intermediate dynamics. The results in
Fig. 3(a) and (b) map closely to the average performance across
many runs in Fig. 10. Fig. 3(a) corresponds to Fig. 10 when
using an SPS without trust mechanism with 15 untrustworthy
nodes. Fig. 3(b) corresponds to Fig. 10 when an SPS with
con-resistant trust is used in this scenario.
Figs. 4–6 represent the mean con-resistant interaction trust
(I-Trust) values as determined by the SPS con-resistant trust
mechanism during 36 simulation runs for each of the three treat-
ment levels. At time 0.180 s, Generator 93 is commanded to
Fig. 4. Mean con-resistant trust results in five untrustworthy nodes.
Fig. 5. Mean con-resistant trust results in 10 untrustworthy nodes.
Fig. 6. Mean con-resistant trust results in 15 untrustworthy nodes.
trip. At time 0.184 s, Generator 93 goes offline. At time 0.192
s, the SPS makes the determination of which load agent nodes
are trusted and untrusted. The error bars represent a 95% confi-
dence interval.
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Fig. 7. Individual cooperative and defective interactions for five untrustworthy
nodes during one simulation run.
The SPS with con-resistant trust is tuned to minimize iden-
tifying unreliable nodes as trusted. Empirical data showed that
the mean error associated with a 95% confidence interval for
the trustworthy nodes is negligible ( 0.0027). The system is
capable of identifying nodes that exhibit cooperative behaviors
with a high degree of certainty, but it is possible for the trust
mechanism to classify a node with cooperative behavior as un-
trusted for a short interval, if its frequency reading deviates
significantly from the mean frequency of all nodes. A signifi-
cant frequency deviation is one that is more than 3.6% outside
one standard deviation from the mean reported frequency for
all nodes, which would make the untrusted node classification
error greater than that for the trusted node.
Fig. 4 shows that the error associated with a 95% confidence
interval for five untrustworthy nodes increases during the sim-
ulation. The larger error signifies false negatives, that is, un-
trustworthy nodes reported as trusted. However, at time 0.192
s, when the final trust determination is made, the high and low
interaction trust (I-Trust) values representing a 95% confidence
interval for the experiment are 0.20614 and 0.66014, re-
spectively. These values fall well below the trust threshold and
would not be selected for load shedding.
As the number of untrustworthy nodes increases, the number
of false negatives decreases. This is evident in the ten and fif-
teen untrustworthy node experiments in Figs. 5 and 6, respec-
tively. The high and low I-Trust values representing a 95% con-
fidence interval for ten untrustworthy nodes at time 0.192 s are
0.74631 and 1.01031. Similarly, the high and low I-Trust
values representing 95% confidence intervals for 15 untrust-
worthy nodes at time 0.192 s are 0.916 and 1.018. In both
cases, the I-Trust values fall well below the threshold to be se-
lected for load shedding. By comparison, the false positive rate
is nearly zero in all cases, as evidenced by tight error bars around
the trustworthy nodes.
Fig. 7 depicts the individual cooperative and defective inter-
actions of five untrustworthy nodes as determined by the SPS
con-resistant trust mechanism during one simulation run. The
Fig. 8. Individual cooperative and defective interactions for 10 untrustworthy
nodes during one simulation run.
Fig. 9. Individual cooperative and defective interactions for 15 untrustworthy
nodes during one simulation run.
untrustworthy nodes' interaction trust (I-Trust) values are se-
verely impacted by their defection activity. Four of the five un-
trustworthy nodes exhibited cooperative behaviors, but none of
their interaction patterns converged to high I-Trust values. For
an untrustworthy node to be trusted, it would take a significant
number of cooperations and considerable time.
Fig. 8 depicts the individual cooperative and defective inter-
actions of ten untrustworthy nodes as determined by the SPS
con-resistant trust mechanism during one simulation run. As
with the five untrustworthy node interactions case, the ten un-
trustworthy nodes' interaction trust (I-Trust) values are severely
impacted by the defection activity. Ninety percent of the un-
trustworthy nodes exhibit cooperative behaviors. As in the five
individual untrusted node interactions, none of the ten untrust-
worthy nodes converge to a high I-Trust value. All of the un-
trustworthy nodes converge to a I-Trust value.
Fig. 9 depicts the individual cooperative and defective inter-
actions of 15 untrustworthy nodes as determined by the SPS
con-resistant trust mechanism during one simulation run. As
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Fig. 10. Comparison of tests with 5, 10, and 15 untrustworthy nodes.
TABLE III
ANOVA NUMERICAL CALCULATION RESULTS BETWEEN SPS WITH NO TRUST
AND SPS WITH CON-RESISTANT TRUST
with the five and ten untrustworthy node cases, the 15 untrust-
worthy nodes' interaction trust (I-Trust) values are also severely
impacted by the defection activity. Of all the untrustworthy
nodes, 93.3% exhibit cooperative behaviors. Just as in the 5
and 10 untrustworthy node cases, none of the 15 untrustworthy
nodes converge to a high I-Trust value. All of the untrustworthy
nodes converge to a 1.0 I-Trust value.
Fig. 10 compares experiments at each treatment level. Each
bar plot represents the mean steady-state frequency reported
at the end of each simulation run. Error bars represent a 95%
confidence interval. The nonoverlapping confidence intervals
show a statistically significant difference between the original
SPS without the trust mechanism and the SPS with con-resis-
tant trust. This indicates that the SPS with con-resistant trust
performed better than the one without a trust mechanism and
that it is extremely unlikely that this occurred by chance.
ANOVA calculations in Table III indicate a significant sta-
tistical difference between the two factors (with and without the
trust mechanism). The -value, is less than ,
which is smaller than an alpha value of 0.05 associated with a
95% confidence interval. The small -value is convincing evi-
dence of a statistical difference between the two factors.
Fig. 11 compares the trust implementations conducted at each
of the treatment levels, including the original SPS without any
trust implementation, Fadul's [6] SPS with majority-rules repu-
tation-based trust, and the con-resistant trust SPS introduced in
this paper. Each bar plot represents the mean steady-state fre-
quency reported at the end of each simulation run. The error bars
represent a 95% confidence interval. A visual analysis shows
Fig. 11. Comparison of test data against prior reputation-based work [6].
TABLE IV
ANOVA NUMERICAL CALCULATION RESULTS BETWEEN SPS WITH
REPUTATION-BASED TRUST AND SPS WITH CON-RESISTANT TRUST
that the SPS with either reputation-based or con-resistant trust
is able to successfully keep the steady-state frequency above
58.8 Hz across all three treatment levels.
The ANOVA analysis in Table IV indicates a statistical differ-
ence between the SPS with con-resistant trust and Fadul's SPS
with reputation-based trust [6]. The -value is approx-
imately 0.0002, which is smaller than an alpha value of 0.05 as-
sociated with a 95% confidence interval. The small -value is
convincing evidence of a statistical difference between the SPSs
with con-resistant and reputation-based trust.
A pairwise -test indicates that a significant statistical differ-
ence between the reputation-based trust and con-resistant trust
enabled 5 and 15 untrustworthy node results with a -value of
0.0004 and in the 10 and 15 untrustworthy node cases with a
-value of 0.0123. These -values are smaller than an alpha
value of 0.05 associated with a 95% confidence interval which is
convincing evidence of a statistical difference between the 5 and
15 untrustworthy node cases and the 10 and 15 untrustworthy
node cases. The pairwise -test results indicated no statistical
difference between 5 and 10 untrustworthy node cases with a
-value being 0.29361. To summarize, the SPS with con-re-
sistant trust is better than the alternative with reputation-based
trust. The difference becomes more significant as the number of
bad/untrusted nodes increases.
These experiments demonstrate that the SPS with the pro-
posed con-resistant trust mechanism outperformed the alterna-
tives tested when faulty or malicious nodes were present.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented an SPS with a con-resistant trust mecha-
nism, which can function in the presence of untrustworthy (ma-
licious or malfunctioning) protection nodes using load shed-
ding to mitigate transient instabilities. Success was determined
by the system's ability to accurately identify which load agent
nodes are trustworthy and its ability to select a sufficient number
of trustworthy nodes to shed load to keep the steady-state fre-
quency above 58.8 Hz. The results showed that the SPS with a
con-resistant trust mechanism was able to keep the steady-state
frequency above the 58.8-Hz threshold. The SPS with a con-re-
sistant trust mechanism also successfully identified nodes that
exhibit cooperative behaviors as trusted and defective behav-
iors as untrusted with a high degree of certainty. An analysis
of the conducted experiments suggests that the benefits of the
con-resistant trust mechanism are statistically significant.
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